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THE COMPLAINT-ALLEGATIONS 'IN
PARTICULAR ACTIONS*
CHARLES EDWARD CLARK
FRAUD AND OTHER DISFAVORED ACTIONS
At common law a higher degree of certainty and more specific
details were required in the declaration in actions which were dis-
favored because of their nature, or in which the defendant's
morality was brought in question. These rules are enforced under
the codes.
Fraud and Deceit
Where the defendant is charged with fraud, misrepresentation,
or deceit, it is felt that the defendant is entitled to the fullest
particulars of the claim or defense in order that he may have
every opportunity to meet the allegations made. Hence, it has
been the rule under both common law and code pleading that allega-
tions of fraud must be made with a great degree of particularity.
Thus, it is said that the elements of fraud in an action for false
representation are five, as follows: (1) a specific false representa-
tion of material facts; (2) knowledge by the person who made
it of its falsity; (3) ignorance of its falsity by the person to whom
it was made; (4) the intention that it should be acted upon; and
(5) that the plaintiff acted upon it to his damage. 88 The question of
fraud may come up not only in an action for damages but also in
actions involving the rescission of a contract, or for some form of
equitable redress, such as reformation of a contract, or as a defense
* The first part of this article appeared in the last number of the NoRTH
CAIoLniA LAW REmEw, February, 1927.
"Colorado Springs Co. v. Wight, 44 Colo. 179, 96 Pac. 820 (1908); Reno
v. Bull, 226 N. Y. 546, 550, 124 N. E. 144 (1919) with note 5 Corn. L. Q. 167;
Martin v. Durham National Bank, 211 N. Y. S. 828 (1925) ; Troganorski V.
Boccafogly, 212 N. Y. S. 89 (1925); Duncan v. Dagen, 318 I1. 500, 149 N. E.
495 (1925) ; Adams v. Barber, 157 Mo. App. 370, 139 S. W. 489 (1911) ; Inman
v. Round Valley Irr. Co., 238 Pac. 1018 (Idaho-1925); J. B. Colt Co. v. Kim-
ball, 190 N. "C. 169, 129 S. E. 406 (1925); 8 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 901; Shipman,
Common Law Pleading, Ball ed., 221. A statement negligently made may
amount to a false representation; Weston v. Brown, 131 AtI. 141 (N. H.-
1925) ; 35 Yale L. J. 767. Plaintiff need not prove all the fraudulent represent-
ations alleged if he proves any material false representation which in fact
served as an inducing cause. Conn. Fuel Co. v. McNeil, 103 Conn. 390, 130 AtI.
794 (1925). See also State v. Martin, 154 N. E. 284 (Ind. 1926).
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against the enforcement of some claim by the plaintiff. 4 Sub-
stantially the same pleading requirements as in the action for deceit
must be fulfilled when fraud is relied on in the other cases. Thus,
in the equity cases the enumeration of the elements is substantially
the same with the suggestion that possibly the second element, and
perhaps sometimes the fifth, may be dispensed with.8 5 Similar
particularity of allegation is required where fraud is set up as a
defense to an action and this requirement is stated in some of the
newer codes.8 6
This rule requiring the pleading of the details of the defendant's
fraud has been incorporated into the model code of the American
Judicature Society following the English practice.8 7
False Imprisonment and Malicious Prosecution
At common law the actions of false imprisonment and malicious
prosecution were sharply distinguished, since the gist of the former
was a direct injury involving a direct restraint upon the plaintiff
which was redressed in the action of trespass, whereas the latter was
an indirect injury requiring an action of trespass on the case. The
gist of the latter action is a prosecution instituted with malice and
without probable cause, resulting in damage in the plaintiff. The
"See Merry Realty Co. v. Shamokin & Hollis R. E. Co., 230 N. Y. 316,
130 N. E. 306 (1921).
" See Colorado Springs Co. v. Wight, supra, n. 83; 2 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence, 357; Ambler v. Chottau, 107 U. S. 586, 1 Sup. Ct. 550 (1882);
Keigwin, Cases on Equity Pleading, 192. There may perhaps be more string-
ent rules as to the burden of proof resting upon the plaintiff in the equitable
cases. See interesting discussion as to mistake, in Susquehanna S. S. Co., Inc.
v. Anderson & Co., 235 N. Y. 285, 146 N. E. 381 (1925) ; Back v. People's Na-
tional Fire Ins. Co., 97 Conn. 336, 116 Atl. 603 (1922); 11 Corn. L. Q. 396;
DeKay v. Shorehaven Realty Co., 104 Conn. 36, 132 Atl. 533 (1926).
"N. Y. C. P. A., sec. 242; Eng. Order 19, rule 15; American Judicature
Society, Rules of Civil Procedure, Bull. 14 (1919). art. 15, sec. 27.' See cases
cited. and criticism of the case of Edgell v. Sigerson, 20 Mo. 494 (1855) in
Bliss on Code Pleading, 3d ed., sec. 339, note.
"American Judicature Society, Rules of Civil Procedure, Bull. 14 (1919)
art. 15, sec. 18: "In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any mis-
representation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence, the
facts must be stated with full particularity, but whenever it is material to
allege malice, fraudulent intention, knowledge, or other condition of the mind
of any person, it shall be sufficient to allege the same as a fact, without set-
ting up circumstances from which the same is to be inferred." The reason
given is as follows: "This is a class of allegation concerning the morality of
the defendant's conduct in which he is entitled to know fully the grounds on
which the allegations are made, so that he may have every opportunity to
prepare his case to clear himself at the trial." See also English Order 19,
rules 6 and 22; Report of New York Board of Statutory Consolidation, 1915,
rules 145, 159.
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allegations must be specific and pointed.88 Where the defendant, in
securing the arrest of the plaintiff, has not attempted to meet the
formal requirements of the law, he is responsible for the damages
for false imprisonment and the elements of malice and want of
probable cause need not be shown; but where he has complied with
such formal requirements, the elements of malice and want of
probable cause must be alleged and proven. Where he has attempted
to meet such formal requirements but where through no fault of
his they are not actually met, most courts likewise impose responsi-
bility only upon a showing of malice and want of probable cause.8 9
Hence, probably the most important distinction between the two
actions, now that the forms have been abolished, is that in the latter
action of malicious prosecution malice and want of probable cause
must be alleged and proven, while it is not necessary in the former.Q0
Slander and Libel
At common law the courts seem to have wished to discourage
actions for defamation and hence they strained to find an innocent
meaning for the words charged. Therefore the requirements of
common law pleading in the case of slander and libel are very
strict. There was necessary a variety of minute averments which
would show the circumstances under which the speaking was made,
the actual words spoken or written, the fact that they were spoken
of and concerning the plaintiff, the innuendoes indicating the mean-
ing conveyed to the hearers detrimental to the plaintiff, the
consequent damage, etc.91 A corresponding particularity of alleg-
, Shipman on Common Law Pleading, ed. Ball., 222; note 34 Yale L. J.
908-9; Dunn v. Gray Co., 150 N. E. 166 (Mass.-1926) -holding the declaration
there given too general; if conviction resulted, facts must ,be set forth to show
that it was wrongful and was caused solely by the defendant; Wingersky v.
Gray Co., 150 N. E. 164 (Mass.-1926).
' Langford v. Boston &' Albany R.R., 144 Mass. 431, 11 N. E., 697 (1887);
Utz v. Mayes, 267 S. W. 59 (Mo.-1925); contra, Krause v. Spiegel, 94 Calif.
370, 29 Pac. 707 (1892) ; 34 Yale L. J. 908-9.
"For the modern distinction between -the two actions see Milton v. Hill,
232 Pac. 526 (N. M.-1924), with discussion in 34 Yale L. J. 908-9. For "mali-
cious prosecution" of a civil action, see Louis J. Sigl, Inc. v. Bresnahan, 215
N. Y. S. 735 (1926). For a form of complaint in false imprisonment see
Brewer v. Wynne, 154 N. C. 467, 70 S. E. 947 (1911). Cf. also McAvey v.
Emergency Fleet Corp., 15 F. (2d) 405 (1926).
"1 See Shipman, Common Law Pleading, ed. Ball., 219, stating the follow-
ing as the formal parts of the declaration for defamation, (1) the inducement
or prefatory statement of the subject matter; (2) the colloquium; (3) the pub-
lication of the scandal itself; (4) the innuendoes; (5) the consequent dam-
ages. See also Odgers, Libel, 5th ed., 136-137; Newell, Slander and Libel,
3d ed., 733.
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ation is required in substance under the codes, except that statutes
in most of the code states do away with some of the formalities of
the complaint in this class of cases. The statutes in substance are
in the following form: "In an action for libel or slander, it is not
necessary to state in the complaint any existing fact for the purpose
of showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter,
but the plaintiff may state in general terms that such matter was
published or spoken concerning him." 92  It is held that the legisla-
tive purpose was to avoid setting forth at length the extrinsic facts
tending to show that plaintiff was the one referred to and to make
sufficient a general averment that the defamatory words were
spoken or published of the plaintiff. It is still as necessary as
formerly to allege not merely the publication of the exact defamatory
words relied upon and that they were spoken or published of and
concerning the plaintiff, but also any facts necessary to explain the
meaning of the words used and to show that they are of defamatory
character.93 Where the defamatory words are considered, by reason
of their serious nature, to be "actionable per se" it is not necessary
to set forth special damages in order to recover, but where the words
are not actionable per se, the special loss to the plaintiff must be
alleged with particularity. 4
"N. Y. C. P. A. Rule 96. Substantially this statute seems to have been
adopted in all code jurisdictions except Arizona and Connecticut. For ex-
ample, see Arkansas, Dig. Stat. 1921, sec. 1228; Calif. Code C. P., 1923, sec.
460; North Carolina, Consol. St., 1919, sec. 542.
"Dias v. Short, 16 How. Pr. 322 (1858) ; Corr v. Sun Printing Assn., 177
N. Y. 131, 69 N. E. 288 (1904) ; Anderson v. Shockley, 266 Mo. 543, 181 S. W.
1151 (1916); Hatfield v. Gazette Printing Co., 103 Kans. 513. 175 Pac. 382
(1918), with note in 3 A. L. R. 1276, 1279; 48 L. R. A. n.s., 355, note. For
additional cases where the innuendo must be pleaded, see Benz v. Wiedenhoeft,
83 Wis. 397, 53 N. W. 686 (1892) ; Chrystal v. Craig, 80 Mo. 357 (1883) ;
DeSanto v. DiNicola, 99 Conn. 717, 122 Atl. 708 (1923) ("bum" in Italian);
Com. v. Szlickys, 150 N. E. 190 (Mass.-1926). For an amusing case holding
that "souphead" is not a defamatory word, see Re Kirk, 130 Atl. 569 (N. J.-
1925). It is urged in some of these cases that the exact words should be
used so that the question of their actionability may be considered on demurrer.
Compare Hatfield v. Gazette Printing Co., supra, n. 93; Zanker v. Lackey,
128 Atl. 373 (Del.-1926); Binston v. O'Malley, 25 Ariz. 552, 220 Pac. 393
(1923) ; 37 A. L. R. 877, 883 with note; Newell on Slander and Libel, 4th ed.,
p. 810 et seq.; note 124 infra. Compare N. Y. Civil Practice Rule 97, "In an
action of slander brought by a woman for words imputing unchastity to her,
it is not necessary to allege or prove special damages." For an interesting
case holding it libelous per se to state of a woman, known to be married, that
she was the latest lady love of another man, see Sidney v. MacFadden News-
paper Pub. Corp., 242 N. Y. 208, 151 N. E. 209 (1926); 11 Corn. L. Q. 568;
35 Yale L. J. 1021; 40 Harv. L. R. 323. See 14 Calif. L. R. 61 urging
that every written defamation should be considered a libel per se or not libelous
at all; discussing Wiley v. Okla. Press Pub. Co., 106 Okla. 52, 233 Pac. 224
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PLEADING TITLE
In actions involving realty or personalty, it is necessary, in order
to show the defendant's duty to the plaintiff, to allege title in the
plaintiff. Thus it becomes necessary in actions for injury or tres-
pass to property, real or personal, for conversion of personalty, for
the recovery of specific realty or personalty, (the modern sub-
stitutes for ejectment and replevin) and for equitable relief involving
property rights, to show the plaintiff's interest in the property in
question.
At common law it was a definite principle that "the pleadings
must show title" and somewhat extensive rules were developed.
Thus in the case of estates in fee simple a general allegation of
seisin in fee simple was sufficient; while the commencement of
particular estates must be shown; where a party claims by inheritance
he must in general show he is heir; by conveyance, the nature of the
conveyance stated according to legal effect. It is often sufficient,
where the substantile rules of law permit recovery, to allege a title
by mere possession. But where a party alleges title in his adversary,
he need not do so more precisely than is sufficient "to show a liability
in the party charged, or to defeat his present claim." 5
Under the codes there has been some difference of opinion as to
just how definite the allegations of title must be. Certain of the
cases were referred to in the previous article.90 Thus while an
allegation that one is entitled to possession of specific property has
been held to be a mere conclusion, yet the allegation that one is the
owner of described property is generally considered sufficient.9 7
(1925). Cf. however, Kee v. Armstrong, Byrd & Co., 75 Okla. 84, 182 Pac.
494, 5 A. L. R. 1349 (1919) ; Reporter's Assn. v. Sun Printing Assn., 186 N. Y
437, 79 N. E. 710 (1906).
95 Stephen, Pleading (ed. Williston), 341-365; Shipman, C. L. Pl. (ed. Ball.)
467-479.
"See 35 Yale L. J. 262, notes 14-16.
Compare Payne v. Treadwell, 16 Calif. 221 (1860) with Sheridan v
Jackson, 72 N. Y. 170 (1878) ; and see other cases cited in the article referred
to note 96, supra; Am. Dig. Pleading, sec. 8 (11). Cf. also Prindle v. Caruthers,
15 N. Y. 425 (1857) ; First Nat. Bk. v. Stallo, 160 A. D. 702 145 N. Y. S.
747 (1914) ; Land Co. v. Lange, 150 N. C. 26, 63 S. E. 164 (1908). As to per-
sonalty see Hunt v. First Nat. Bank of Halfway, 102 Or. 298, 202 Pac. 564(1921) ; Scofield v. Whitelegge, 49 N. Y. 259 (1872). Many codes provide that
in an action for the recovery of real property, plaintiff may allege merely
that he -has a legal estate therein and is entitled to the possession thereof, de-
scribing it with such certainty as to identify it, and that the defendant unlaw-
fully keeps him out of the possession; it is not necessary to state how the
plaintiff's estate or ownership is derived. Ohio Gen. Code, 1921, sec. 11903;
Ore. L. 1920, sec. 327; Wyo. Comp. St. 1920, sec. 6236; Wash. Rem. Comp.
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On the other hand, the stating of specific detailed facts which lead
directly to the inference that plaintiff is entitled to possession has
been held to state evidentiary and not the necessary ultimate facts.98
In spite of the seeming confusion of the cases it would seem that
the rules discussed in the previous article as to the degree of
particularity of allegation should apply. In general, the allegation
of ownership should be sufficient as showing title. Essentially the
same principles should govern whether realty or personalty is
involved. A good statement of the rule is found in a recent New
York case criticising the plaintiff for stating his entire chain of
title: "In any real property action, plaintiff must, as the pleading
phrase goes, show his title; that is, he must state some fact or facts
which give him the right to possession, as that he is the owner of
the fee or of a term of years or otherwise. The ordinary form of
statement is that plaintiff is the owner in fee or otherwise, and is
entitled to the immediate possession of certain described premises.
He may, however, show his title by deed, alleging that his grantor
was, on a certain date, lawfully seized of certain described premises,
and while in such ownership and possession conveyed the same to
plaintiff by a certain detcribed deed: Similarly, if plaintiff's title
comes to him by devise or by descent, the facts may be pleaded.
But ordinarily it is neither permissible nor necessary to go back and
set forth the entire chain of title in the grantor, devisor, or
ancestor."99
St. 1922, sec. 793; Wis. Stat. 1921, sec. 3077; Kas, Rev. St. 1923, sec. 60-2001(may also sue on equitable title) ; cf. Iowa, Comp. Code 1919, sec. 7272, 7273(deed may be pleaded according to legal effect; commencement of a par-
ticular estate not necessary unless essential to the merits of the cause). It
has been held that upon a showing of lawful title in the plaintiff and an un-
lawful withholding of possession by the defendant, it is not necessary to add
an allegation that the plaintiff is entitled to possession, Walter v. Lockwood,
23 Barb. 228 (1856) ; Townsite Co. v. Saive, 104 Minn. 472, 116 N. W. 947
(1908), but see Mansur v. Streight, 103 Ind. 358, 3 N. E. 112 (1885) ; Mash v.
Bloom, 113 Wis. 646, 114 N. W. 457 (1907), holding also that the extent of
the plaintiff's estate or interest must be stated.
"McCaughey v. Schuette, 117 Calif. 223, 46 Pac. 666 (1896) criticised in
35 Yale L. J. 266, n. 33. Cf. Schultz v. Salberg, 80 Ore. 668, 157 Pac. 1114(1916).
"Crook v. Licourt. 214 N. Y. S. 774 (1926). Cf. also Brooks v. Wheeler,
243 N. Y. 28, 152 N. E. 455 (1926). Most of the code states require that the
realty must be described with such convenient certainty that the sheriff on
execution may identify it. Ark. Dig. Stat. 1921, sec. 1230; Cal. C. C. P. 1923,
sec. 455; Kas. Rev. Stat. 1923, sec. 60-748; Ohio Gen. Code, sec. 11344; Wyo.
Comp. St. 1920, sec. 5685; Nev. R. L. 1912, sec. 5069. Cf. Iowa Comp. Code,
1919, sec. 7275; Frazier v. Nichols, 48 Okla 33, 150 Pac. 711 (1915).
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The same case also states the requirement that the premises
must be described with directness and not merely by deduction or
inference.
Here, as elsewhere, a following of the common law precedents
should be a protection to the pleader.10 0
Legal or Equitable Title
In connection with the question who is the real party in interest,
to bring suit, the question may be raised whether an equitable title-
holder can bring an action for possession of land or personalty or
for injury thereto in view of the oft repeated statements in code
cases of common law rules such as that "an equitable title will not
support ejectment." This, as we saw, involved a very serious failure
to give due recognition to the union of law and equity. The problem
now is, not what facts would support one of the old common law
forms of action, but did the plaintiff before the code have a sub-
stantive jural right enforceable either at law or in equity. If he
did, he probably has it still, enforceable in the code action, since
the code was not intended to take away rights but to facilitate their
enforcement. While many holders of equities could not sue for
possession or for injury thereto-witness the ordinary cestui of an
express trust,-yet they had remedies in equity under certain con-
ditions. Thus a claim for specific performance with delivery of
possession should not be denied by calling it "ejectment." In fact
the delivery of possession, under modern conditions where the court
judgment filed in the land records, makes title, may be perhaps the
most important part of the judgment.' 0 ' The combined procedure
should permit also of short cuts, such as reformation of a deed and
possession thereunder.' 0 2  Similar rules apply in the case of
'35 Yale L. J. 273, 4.
'
0 1 See discussion by R. M. Hutchins, Equitable Ejectment, 26 Col. L. R.
436 (1926) ; Clark & Hutchins, The Real Party in Interest, 34 Yale L. J. 259(1925). Cf. Klapp v. Dealey, 213 A. D. 523, 211 N. Y. S. 22 (1925) ; Neal v.
Baker, 147 N. E. 635 (Ind.-1925) ; Warner v. Coleman,.107 Okla. 292, 231 Pac.
1053 (1924) ; Rocha v. Rocha, 240 Pac. 1010 (Cal.-1925) with Peck v. Newton,
46 Barb. 173 (1862) ; McDonald v. Skinner, 124 Misc. 545, 209 N. Y. S. 219
(1925) ; Halsell v. Beartail, Okla. 227 Pac. 39 (Okla.-1924) ; Grace v. Hilde-
brant, 237 Pac. 98 (Okla.-1925). Several states by statute permit suit by the
equitable owner. 26 Col. L. R. 436, n. 4.
1 Warner v. Coleman and Rocha v. Rocha, Aupra, note 101. Cf. Mirando
v. Mirando, 104 Conn. 318, 132 Ati. 110 (1926) with Imperial Shale Brick Co.
v. Jewett, 169 N. Y. 143, 62 N. E. 167 (1901) ; Johnson v. Purpura, 208 A. D.
505, 203 N. Y. S. 536 (1924) ; Comment 34 Yale L. J. 536; 36 Yale L. J. 279(1926).
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personalty and have been followed with perhaps less question.1°0
The stating of the equitable interest involves no different principle,
although the conditions are somewhat different. It is necessary to
set forth the facts showing the plaintiff's right. This may mean,
therefore, not the mere statement that the plaintiff is the owner or
"entitled to" Blackacre, but that plaintiff entered into a contract for
the purchase of Blackacre, etc.,--i. e., allegations justifying specific
performance under the old equity procedure.' 0 4
PLEADING CORPORATE OR FIDuciARY CAPACITY
A distinction is drawn in the cases between the right to sue and
capacity to sue. A person has the right to sue when he has a right
or action against a defendant, and the defendant is under an
immediate duty to him; while he has the capacity only if he is free
from such legal disabilities as would prevent his appearance as a
party litigant in a -court of law. Thus, if the plaintiff is not the
person injured, he has not a right of action; whereas if the plaintiff
is the person injured but he is a minor or under legal disability or is
a foreign corporation which has not complied with the rules of the
state as to conditions precedent to doing business within the state,
he may lack capacity to appear in a court of justice.10 5 The show-
ing of a right to sue is part of the plaintiff's case but it is a matter of
defense to be set up by the defendant that the plaintiff lacks legal
capacity to sue.
Since lack of capacity may in effect prevent the immediate
enforcement of a right of action, the distinction tends to become
faint and shadowy. It seems, however, a fair one between a show-
ing of any substantial legal right on the one hand, and on the other
a showing of some purely procedural defect which, even if existing,
can in the greater number of cases easily be remedied and is prob-
ably being relied upon by the defendant for the sake of delay. Since
objections to the capacity of the parties are looked upon as generally
Cassidy v. First National Bank, 30 Minn. 86 (1882) ; Kingsland v. Chris-
man, 28 Mo. App. 308 (1887); see Wheeler v. Allen, 51 N. Y. 37 (1872).
, Cf. Klapp v. Dealey and Neal v. Baker, supra, note 101; Kas. Rev. Stat.
1923, sec. 60-2001; Grave v. Templier, 151 N. E. 514 (Ili.-1926). Cf. also
Brooks v. Wheeler, note 99, supra. As to the bill to quiet title-the substitute
for "ejectment" when the plaintiff is in possession-no essentially different
principles apply, although the operative facts as to possession are obviously
different. Pomeroy, Equity .urisp., sec. 2146 et seq.
"'Brown v. Curtis, 128 Cal. 193, Pac. (1900); Ward v. Petrie, 157 N. Y.
301, 311, 51 N. E. 1002 (1898); Berken v. Marsh, 18 Mont, 152, 44 Pac. 528
(1896) ; Wiesmann v. Donald, 125 Wis. 600, 104 N. W. 916 (1905).
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dilatory, no allegations by the plaintiff are necessary other than the
showing who the parties are, while the objections must be made
specifically by the defendant.1 0 6 The distinction is therefore justified
from the standpoint of fairness and convenience.
Pleading Corporate Capacity.
In accordance with the distinctions just stated, it seems to have
been the rule at common law that where a suit was brought by a
corporation in its corporate name, or against a corporation in such
name, no allegation of corporate existence was necessary. The
cases are divided under the codes107 but the greater number and the
better rule would seem to hold that no such allegation is necessary.
In New York by specific provision the allegation is required.1 08
Where either party is a corporation it may be made in general
form, viz., "that the plaintiff is and at all times hereinafter mentioned
was a domestic corporation, organized under the laws of the state
of New York." 10
Pleading Fiduciary Capacity
A somewhat similar situation exists as to the pleading of the
appointment of the plaintiff as administrator, executor, guardian,
receiver, and the like. It is necessary in any event that the pleading
should show the capacity in which the plaintiff is attempting to sue,
for if the right of action is shown to be in the plaintiff as adminis-
""Under most codes it must be done by special demurrer. See e.g., North
Carolina Consol. St. 1919, sec. 511 (2); Hicks v. Beam, 112 N. C. 642, 17
S. E. 490 (1893).
1 That specific allegations are not necessary, see N. W. Hardware & Steel
Co. v. Winnett, 67 Mont. 545, 216 Pac. 568 (1923) with note in 22 Mich. L. R.
175; Moormnan Mfg. Co. v. Heach, 135 Minn. 126, 160 N. W. 258 (1916) with
note 1 Minn. L. R. 181; Burlington Groc. Co. v. Heaphys Estate, 126 At. 525(Vt.-1924). Contra, Miller v. Pine Mining Co., 2 Idaho 1206, 3 Idaho 493,
31 Pac. 803 (1892), 35 A. S. R. 289 and note; Citizens Bank v. Corkings, 9
S. D. 614, 70 N. W. 1059 (1897). Cf. where the action involves the facts
of corporate existence. Holden v. Great Western Elev. Co., 69 Minn. 527, 72
N. W. 805 (1897). For the common law rule, see Woolf v. City Steamboat
Co., 7 C. B. 103 (1849). In. general see Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. sec. 3042, 3042,
citing cases; Ann. Cas. 1913 C. 33; 14A, C. J. 815, 818.
10 C. P: A. rule 93; C. C. P. 1775; Federal Equity Rule 25. Cf. Minn.
G. S. 1923, sec. 9271; Ariz. Rev. Stat. 1913, sec. 429; Iowa Comp. Code, 1919,
sec. 7268; Wis. Stat. 1921, sec 3205, 4199; Utah, Comp. L. 1917, sec. 6610,
6611; Nev. R. L. 1912, sec. 5078, 9.
"'Abbott's Forms of Pleading, 2d ed., 54; 2 Bradbury's Forms, 2d ed.,
20; Fletcher's Cyc. Corporations, sec. 3043; Ann. Cas. 1913, C. 335; N. Y. C.
P. A. rule 93; statutes, ante note 108.
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trator and he is suing as an individual, no right of action is stated.
The plaintiff as individual and the plaintiff as executor or adminis-
trator are fundamentally different persons.1 10 Hence, the caption
or description of the parties to the complaint should dearly show
the capacity in which the plaintiff is suing. A question has been
raised whether the giving of the plaintiff's name, followed by the
words "administrator or executor" with or without the name of
the estate, are sufficient or are anything more than descriptio
personae without the complete form using the word "as," viz., "John
Smith, as Administrator of the Estate of James Jones." The omis-
sion of the word "as" has been held to show the suit to be in the
personal capacity,1 1 ' though the better rule would seem to be that
where the word is omitted, yet if the whole complaint shows the
plaintiff to have sued in the representative -capacity, the omission is
supplied."12 Where the parties are correctly described, no further
allegation of the appointment of the plaintiff in the representative
capacity should be held necessary."18 It is possible to argue that
unless the plaintiff shows his due appointment, he has shown no right,
not merely no capacity, to sue. From the more practical standpoint,
however, he has sufficiently shown this by his description of himself
as administrator in the caption of the suit, and it is probable that the
objection under the circumstances is likely to be dilatory, just as in
the case of a similar objection in the case of lack of allegation of
" Williams v. Fischlein, 144 A. D. 244, 129 N. Y. S. 129 (1911) ; Powell V.
Jackson, 60 Ind. App. 597, 111 N. E. 208 (1916). See Dennison v. Payne, 293
Fed. 333, 342 (1923), which is disapproved on its exact point in Chicago, R. L &
P. Co. v'. Schendel, 46 Sup. Ct. 420 (1926). Cf. Mo. K. & T. Ry v. Wulff,
226 U. S. 570, 33 Sup. Ct. 135 (1913) ; 33 Yale L. J. 326.
'Cf. Genet v. De Graaf, 27 A, D. 238, 50 N. Y. S. 442 (1898) ; Nolin v.
Mooty, 29 Ga. App. 97, 113 S. E. 814 (1922); Stilwell v. Carpenter, 62 N. Y.
639, 2 Abb. N. C. 238 (1875) and note; Lucas v. Pittman, 94 Ala. 616, 10 So.
603 (1892).
'Beers v. Shannon, 73 N. Y. 292 (1878) ; Willetts v. Haines, 96"A. D. 5,
88 N. Y. S. 1018 (1904), affd. 182 N. Y. 543, 75 N. E. 1135 (1905); Cart v.
Carr, 15 Cal. App. 480, 115 Pac. 261 (1911); Rich v. Lowles, 64 Vt. 408, 23
Atl. 723, 15 L. R. A. 850 (with note) (1892); Holloway v. Galvin, 203 Ala.
663, 84 So. 737 (1920).
'Southern Ry. v. Gantt, 210 Ala. 383, 98 So. 192 (1923) ; Toner v. Wag-
tier, 158 Ind. 447, 63 N. E. 859 (-1902); Langdon v. Potter, 11 .Mass. 313(1814); Brown v. Nourse, 55 Me; 230 (1867); Champlin v. Tilley, 3 Day(Conn.) 303, 305 (1809) ; Lawson v. Lawson (16 Gratt), 57 Va. 230 (1861) ;
Sabin v. Hamilton, 2 Ark. 485 (1839); Kelly v. Leve, 35 Ind. 106 (1871);
Hyde v. Keonshe Co., 43 Wis. 129 (1871) ; Ellis v. Appleby, 4 R. I. 462 (1857) ;
Jordan v. Hamlink, 21 D. C. 189 (1892); 2 S. W. Dig. 461, 462 (1871). Con-
tra, Sheldon v. Joy, 11 How. Prac. 11 (1855); White v. Jay, 13 N. Y. 83(1855) (receiver) ; Ferris v. Jones, 78 Okla. 154, 189 Pac. 527 (1920). See
Am. Dig. Parties 71, Pleading 46.
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corporate capacity. To require a specific allegation in every case
is to require the addition to a complaint of an allegation which is
naturally to be assumed in practically every case and which will be of
importance only in the comparatively rare case where the defendant
will have a real opportunity to make objection upon the score of a
defect in the appointment. The defendant should have the burden
of raising the issue in such extraordinary situation. A similar rule
should apply to a suit against a fiduciary, with perhaps even stronger
reason since the knowledge of the appointment is with the
defendant. 114
It is sometimes asserted that while the above general rule may
apply to the case of administrators or executors, a special and
stricter rule should apply to the more unusual appointments, such
as those of administrators d. b. n. It is not clear, however, why any
different rule should apply in such cases.115
Under the New York rule, where the specific allegation must be
made, it is sufficient to make it in general form, referring to the
appointment by the surrogate of a specified county, in view of the
rule that a judgment may be pleaded in general form.110
Where the right of action is actually in the plaintiff in his personal
capacity, the reference to his fiduciary capacity may be treated as
descriptio persomiae, and if necessary, rejected as surplusage.117
PLEADING DAMAGE
We have already seen that the complaint must demand judg-
ment.118 Where money damages are demanded, the complaint
must show a right of action in the plaintiff for such damages. The
nature of the facts to be alleged to such end will of course vary
"Miller v. Wilmington Trust Co., 24 Del. 251, 75 Atl. 789 (1910) ; Giglo
v. Barrett, 207 Ala. 278, 92 So. 668 (1922) (city commissioners). Cf. Jatti-
McQuade Co. v. Flynn, 79 Misc. 430, 140 N. Y. S. 135; Rich v. Lowles, note
112 supra; see also cases, note 113, supra.
'Hamilton v. Mclndoo, 81 Minn. 324, 84 N. W. 118 (1900), criticized by
Professor Costigan, 11 Ill. L. R. 517, 528; cf. 8 Ency. Pl. Prac. 669, 670.
"Secor v. Pendleton, 47 Hun. 281 (1888) (must state that deceased left
property and letters of administration were issued by a surrogate having auth-
ority) ;Brenner v. McMahon, 20 A.D. 3, 46 N. Y. S. 643 (1897) (more gen-
eral allegations permissible as to executors). As to pleading a judgment, see
N. Y. C. P. A. Rule 95; C. C. P. sec. 532. Cf. Chamberlain v. Liner, 31 Minn.
371, 18 N. W. 97 (1884) ; Judah. v. Fredericks, 57 Cal. 389 (1881). As to
pleading appointment of a received, see Manley v. Rassiga, 13 Hun. 288 (1878);
Rockwell v. Merwin, 45 N. Y. 166 (1871).
"" See Hitt v. Carr, 77 Ind. App. 488, 130 N. E. 1 (1921) ; Huot v, Oiler,
118 Atl. 871 (R. I.-1923) ; cases in notes 111, 112 supra; 15'L. R. A. 850, note.
"' 35 Yale L. J. 285-292.
THE COMPLAINT-ALLEGATIONS
according to the controlling substantive rules of law. In some of
these the nature and extent of the injury is more important than
in others. Thus, in an action for trespass to land the mere entry
upon the land of another constitutes an actionable wrong without
reference to the extent of the plaintiff's loss. So, also, a breach of
contract may give rise to a claim for at least nominal damages. On
the other hand, there is no claim for negligence or for fraud except
where actual injury has been caused to the plaintiff, and only to the
extent of such injury.119 Even in the cases where the extent of the
injury is not important in showing that a right of action exists, it
is nevertheless important if more than a small sum is to be recovered.
Thus, in the action of trespass, the extent of the loss caused to the
plaintiff by the defendant's acts should be shown if any extensive
recovery is desired. In general the facts of injury or loss to the
plaintiff should be set forth in the statement of his story in sub-
stantially similar form to the other facts upon which he wishes to
rely.120
See e.g., Ashby v. White, Ld. Raym, 928 (1763); Webb v. Portland
Mfg. Co., 3 Sumn. 189, Fed. Cas. No. 17, 322 (1838) ; Chamberlain v. Parker,
45 N. Y. 569 (1871); and cf. Schlesinger v. O'Rourke, 121 Atl. 214 (R. I.-
1923) (declaration in fraud held demurrable- for failure to show damage).
See discussion, Hale, Damages (ed. Colley), 29-41; Sedgwick, Damages, 9th
ed., Ch. VI; Martz v. De Bar, note 32, supra.
'Damages must be alleged to have been sustained. Harndon v. Stultz,
124 Iowa, 734, 100 N. W. 851 (1904. Even where the defendant has defaulted, a
judgment for substantial damages can only be based upon a failure of duty of
the defendant set forth in the complaint. Seltzer v. Davenport, 74 Conn. 46,
49 Atl. 482 (1901) ; cf. 2 Sutherland, Damages, 4th ed., sec. 429. The dam-
ages need not be itemized. Salt River Canal Co. v. Hickey, 4 Ariz. 240, 36
Pac. 171 (1894) ; Castino v. Ritzman, 156 Cal. 587, 105 Pac. 739 (1909);
Prentiss v. Barness, F Allen, 410 (1863). Nor the precise amount, nor the true
theory given, where a legal wrong and a resulting pecuniary injury are averred.
Colrick v. Swinburne. 105 N. Y. 503, 507 (1887); Winter v. Am. Aniline
Products, Inc., 236 N. Y. 199, 140 N. E. 561 (1923). Cf. Matyzewski v. Wheeler,
97 Conn. 593, 117 Atl. 545 (1922) (complaint for personal injuries as a result of
which plaintiff was obliged to have hospital treatment and' medical attention
for which he had spent and must continue to spend large sums of money;
held, items of expenditure admissible). Where double or treble damages are
sought under a statute they should be specifically demanded. Dunbar v. Jones,
87 Conn. 253, 87 Atl. 787 (1913) ; Salmon v. Blasier Co., 123 A. D. 171, 108
N. Y. S. 448 (1908). But see Smith v. Hallahan, 75 N. H. 534, 78 Ati. 122
(1910). Where exemplary damages are claimed the facts justifying the award
should .be stated, although it has been held that no special claim is required.
Gustavson v. Wind, 62 Iowa, 281 (1883) ; Andrews v. Stone, 10 Minn. 72
(1865) ; Kearns v. Widman, 94 Conn. 257, 108 Atl. 661 (1919) ; Stark v. Epler,
59 Ore. 262, 117 Pac. 276 (1911). But see Anderson v. Shockley, 159 Mo. A.
334, 140 S. W. 755 (1911); Krone v. Block, 144 Mo. App, 575, 129 S. W. 43
(1910) under a statute. See Dec. Dig. Damages, sec. 151.
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General and Special Damages
A distinction has been drawn for pleading purposes between
general damages, which it is said need not be alleged, and special
damages, which must be alleged, in order that the defendant may
not be taken by surprise. General damages are such as are naturally
presumed to follow from the injuries alleged, while special damages
are those which are not so presumed to follow.1 21 The distinction
is stated as an arbitrary one, but in practice it seems to become a
distinction of degree only. The general theory of damage in law
depends on the theory of proximate cause; such damages are
recoverable as are the proximate results of the defendant's wrongful
act.' 22 Such damages as in the natural normal course of events
may be expected to happen need not be set forth with particularity,
although it should be noted that the fact of injury itself giving rise
to the damage must be set forth. On the other hand, results out
of the ordinary must be stated with some degree of care. Thus, if
plaintiff is run into by the defendant's automobile and his leg
broken, certain damages for pain and suffering may naturally be
expected to follow; whereas, on the other hand, loss of a permanent
job may not, and, if claimed, must be set out with some detail. 128
Examples of this general nature between what may normally be
expected, which need not be set forth beyond the fact of the injury
itself, and what inay not be expected, which must be set forth in
' See classic treatment of the rule by Chitty. Ch. Pl. 410, 411 quoted 4
Sedgwick, Damages, 9th ed., see. 1261; Hale, Damages, ed. Cooley, 332-337;
Dumont v. Smith, 4 Denio, 319, 322 (1847); Tomlinson v. Derby, 43 Conn.
567 (1876). Cf, also Sailer v. Fine, N. J. 130 Atl. 610 (1925) ; 2 Sutherland,
Damages, 4th ed., sec. 419-421; Comment, 9 Corn. L. Q. 70, on Winter v. Am.
Aniline Products, Inc., 236 N. Y. 199, 140 N. E. 561 (1923). For collections of
some of the many cases applying the distinction in pleading, see the texts above
cited; also Dec. Dig. Damages, sec. 6, 142 et seq.
'Gilman v. Noyes, 57 N. H. 627 (1876) ; Georgia v. Kepford, 45 Iowa, 48
(1876); McNamara v. Clintonville, 62 Wis. 207, 22 N. W. 472 (1885);
Mecham and Gilbert's Cas. Damages, 145-220; Sedgwick, Damages, 9th ed.,
Chap. VII, et seq.; Hale, Damages, ed. Cooley, 42-87. The same rule is
applied in contract cases although the famous "rule in Hadley v. Baxendale,' 9
Exch. 341 (1854) emphasizes the element of foreseeability. Sedgwick, op. cit.,
sec. 147a et seq; 11 Corn L. Q. 223, 540 (1926).
n An allegation that plaintiff "was prevented from transacting his ordinary
business" does not justify the admission of evidence as to the per diem value
of plaintiff's services. Eckert v. Levinson, 91 Conn. 338, 99 Atl. 699 (1917) ;
Taylor v. Monroe, 46 Conn. 36, 46 (1875); Tomlinson v. Derby, supra, note
121. On recovery of lost earnings, see Dempsey v. Scranton, 264 Pa. 495,
107, At1. 877 (1919) ; Baxter v. Phila. etc. Ry., 264 Pa. 467, 107 Ati. 881 (1919)
with note 29 Yale L. J. 565. Cf. Winter v. Am. Aniline Products, Inc., note
121, supra (where complaint shows non-acceptance of goods by a vendee, loss
due to decreased market value is general and may be recovered).
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some detail, are numerous. In fact, special damages may be of
two kinds; first, in certain classes of cases, such damages must be
shown in order that there be any substantive right of action at all,
as, for instance, in certain forms of slander; and second, in the
ordinary case above stated, where additional damages over the
ordinary loss which is presumed are being claimed by the plaintiff.1 24
Where the damages are held to be special and thus require
particular specification, the degree of particularity required varies.
Here, as in the case of other allegations in the complaint, there
should be no set rule but the general test should be fair notice to
the defendant with the right in him to ask for a more complete state-
ment upon his showing that he is not fairly apprised of the elements
of the plaintiff's case.12 5
CLIxms FOR SPEcIFIc RELmF
The demand for a judgment may be for a judgment in specie, such
as specific performance or injunction. In general, such a demand will
be based upon a right of action recognized in the ancient courts of
chancery, and should therefore be based upon such facts as would
have sustained the old equitable bill. Thus, in a code action for
the specific performance of a contract the allegations should be
sufficient to have justified specific performance in a court of
equity.126 The same also is true with reference to claims for the
' Cf. Bliss, Code Pleading, 3d ed., sec. 297b. As to fraud, see Schlesinger
v. O'Rourke, note 119, supra; Comment, 5 Corn. L. Q. 167. As to words not
slanderous per se, see cases and authorities cited note 94 supra,' 37 A. L. R.
877, 883; N. Y. C. P. A. rule 97; Yakavicze v. Vatentukevicious, 84 Conn. 350,
80 At. 94, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 1264, with note (1911) ; Krone v. Block, note 120,
supra. Cf. Georgia v. Kepford, supra, note 122. For special damages as addi-
tional damages, see note 121, supra. As to damages where a public nuisance is
also claimed to be a private one, see Brown v. Rea, 150 Calif. 171, 88 Pac.
713 (1907).
See cases, supra, e.g., Matyfewski v. Wheeler, note 120, supra; Winter
v. Am. Aniline Products, Inc., notes 121, 123, supra; Eckert v. Levinson, note
123, supra. Examples of pleading damage are given in Sedgwick, Elements
of the Law of Damages, 2d ed., Chap. 25. Cf. Fledderman v. St. Louis Transit
Co., 134 Mo. App. 199, 113 S. W. 1143 (1908) (allegation that plaintiff's right
leg was broken near the hip will justify proof that the leg was shortened by
the fracture); Keefe v. Lee, 197 N. Y. 68, 90 N. E. 344 (1909), 3 judges
dissenting (that plaintiff was "seriously and permanently injured through his
head, skull, eyes and bruises to his right leg and body" did not permit of
recovery of damages for deafness caused by the injury to his head) ; Kane v.
New Idea Realty Co., 133 Atl. 686 (Conn.-1926); Am. Jud. Soc. Rules, Bull.
XIV (1919), Art. 15, Sec. 21 (allegations in general terms sufficient).
'" See cases collected in 2 Cook's Cas. Equity, p. 1, et seq.; Dec. Dig. Sp.
Perf., sec. 112-114. Cf. e.g., Newham v. Kenton, 79 Mo. 382 (1883); Grove
v. Templin, 151 N. E. 514 (I11.-1926).
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cancellation or reformation of a contract, 127 or for the granting of
an injunction.' 28 No technical requirement is made other than a
stating of facts sufficient to justify the equitable relief asked for.
Under the more flexible procedure of the code, too, it is possible
to ask for such equitable relief in specific cases in addition to legal
claims, such as formerly must have been considered alone in a court
of law.12
9
Since the demand for judgment forms no part of the cause of
action, a complaint which fails to show ground for the equitable
relief claimed, but does show ground for money damages, should
not be considered demurrable. This point has already been dis-
cussed elsewhere at some length.180
THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
One of the most desirable of the newly developed procedural
devices is that of the declaratory judgment, known for some time to
the jurisprudence of other countries, notably England, and really
employed in this country to a limited extent in a certain class of
cases such as actions to construe wills, but only recognized since 1919
by state legislatures as a distinctive remedial step. Since that date
the statutes of some nineteen states have provided for the use of
See cases collected, 3 Cook's Cas. Equity, p. 1, et seq.; 9 C. J. 131t et
seq.; 34 Cyc. 976, et seq.; Dec. Dig. Cancellation sec. 36, et seq., Reformation,
sec. 36. Cf. Merry Realty Co. v. Shamokin & Hollis R. E. Co., 230 N. Y.
101, 130 N. E. 306 (1921) and see the discussion and cases cited, note 85,
supra, as to pleading fraud, referring to the interesting question of quantum
of proof in the proceedings for equitable relief.
'See cases collected 32 C. J. 319, et seq.; Dec. Dig. Injunctions, sec. 116-
118; McHenry v. Jewett, 90 N. Y. 58 (1882) ("It is not sufficient to auth-
orize the remedy by injunction, that a violation of a naked legal right of prop-
erty is threatened. There must be some special ground of jurisdiction, and
where an injunction is the final relief sought, facts which entitle the plaintiff
to this remedy, must be averred in the complaint, and established on the hear-
ing") ; Brown v. Rea, 150 Calif. 171 88 Pac. 713 (1907) (special injury must
be alleged and proven before a private person is entitled to an injunction
against a public nuisance). That ordinarily in proceedings for equitable re-
lief more detailed statements of facts are expected and permitted, see Smith
v. Smith, 50 S. C. 54, 27 S. E. 545 (1897) quoting Pomeroy, Code Remedies,
sec. 527.
" See e.g., Mirando v. Mirando, 104 Conn. 318, 132 Atd. 110 (1926) with
note 36 Yale L. J. 279; cases note 102, supra; Back v. People's Natl. Fire Ins.
Co., 97 Conn. 336, 116 Atl. 603 (1922); Syracuse v. Hogan, 234 N. Y. 457,
138 N. E. 406 (1923) ; Johnson v. Purpura, 208 A. D. 505, 203 N. Y. S. 581
(1924), discussed in 34 Yale L. J. 536-542.
'" Clark, The Union of Law and Equity, 25 Columbia L. R. 1; 35 Yale
L. J. 288, 289. For the necessity in general of alleging facts showing the
inadequacy of money damages as a remedy where equitable relief is claimed,
see ibid.; also 34 Yale L. J. 208.
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this remedy and a uniform declaratory judgment act has been pre-
pared by the commissioners on uniform state laws and has already
been adopted in several of these states. An act has also been
presented to Congress authorizing the federal courts to render
declaratory judgments. It has a good chance of passage.' 3'
Under this procedure the courts may declare rights and other
legal relations in a binding judgment between the parties without
granting other remedies, such as damages or injunction. This
permits a court, for example, to declare the meaning of a contract
or a will before one of the parties has committed a wrong or suffered
a definite loss. The Michigan law was declared unconstitutional by
the Michigan courts on the theory that it attempted to empower the
court to render an advisory opinion only,'3 2 a non-judicial function,
according to the court's view. The court was, however, quite in
error on this point, since the judgment is not advisory but is a
definite judgment which becomes res adjudicata like any other. The
decision has been thoroughly repudiated by the courts of all other
states where the matter has come up and has been severely criticized
by text writers and may now be considered of little weight.' 83
"This practice, known in England since 1852, and on the European con-
tinent and in Scotland for hundreds of years prior thereto, seems to have been
introduced -to the profession of this country in its more extended form by Pro-
fessors Sunderland (A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights, 16 Mich. L. R.
69, 1917; cf. 54 Am. L. R. 161, 1920) and Borchard (The Declaratory Judg-
inent-A Needed Procedural Reform), 28 Yale L. J. 1, 105 (1918). The
latter monograph gives an extended account of the history of the procedure
in other countries. Since these pioneer articles the law review literature has
been voluminuous. For bibliography of articles in addition to those herein-
after cited, see the various articles of Professor Borchard, including The
Uniform Act on Declaratory Judgments, 36 Harv. L. R. 687; 29 Yale L. J.
545; 30 Yale L. J. 161; 31 ibid., 419; Progress of the Declaratory Judgment, 35
ibid., 473, 867; 18 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 305; 66 Cong. Rev. 432 and Rice, 28
W. Va. L. Q. 1, 27, 28; see also Freeman, Judgments, 5th ed., 2780-2792; 12
A. L. R. 1, 52-92; 19 A. L. R. 1124-1137. For the state statutes see Florida,
Laws, 1919, ch. 7857 (No. 75); Michigan, Pub. Acts, 1919, No. 150, p. 278;
Wisconsin, Laws, 1919, ch. 242, sec. 2687m, p. 253, repealed in 1923, Laws, ch.
440; New York, 1920, C. P. A., sec. 473; Connecticut, Acts, 1921, ch. 258;
Kansas, Acts, 1921, ch. 168; California, Sts., 1921, ch. 463, Code of Civ. Proc.,
secs. 1060-1062; Hawaii, Laws, 1921, ch. 162; Kentucky, Acts, 1922, ch. 83;
Virginia, Acts, 1922, ch. 517; South Carolina, Stats. at L. 1922, ch. 542. The
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, approved in 1922, has been adopted prac-
tically unchanged by Pennsylvania, Laws, 1923, ch. 321; Tennessee, Acts, 1923,
ch. 29; Colorado, Acts, 1923, ch. 98; Wyoming, Acts, 1923, ch. 50; North
Dakota, Acts, 1923, ch. 237; New Jersey, Pub. Laws, 1924, p. 312; Utah, Laws,
1925, p. 40; South Dakota, Laws, 1925, ch. 24, p. 230. The Federal Act has
passed the Federal House of Representatives.
'Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry., 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350 (1920) ; 12 A.
L. R. 26, 52.
reState ex rel. Hopkins v. Grove, 109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82 (1921) (see 31
Yale L. J. 419, 19 A. L. R. 1124) ; Braman v. Babcock, 98 Conn. 549, 120 Ad.
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Under the procedure of the states where the remedy has been
most fully developed, the plaintiff may in his demand for judgment
ask for a declaration declaring the rights of the parties either as the
sole relief asked for or else in addition to or as auxiliary to other
relief. Likewise the defendant may counterclaim for such relief.18 4
This permits of a very flexible and desirable procedure whereby the
parties may seek such remedial relief as they may think they are
entitled to and at the same time the court may go on and settle fully
the rights of the parties even though as yet no loss or damage has
been incurred upon the points so settled. Formerly the courts could
only give remedial relief. Under this procedure they may give
preventive and declaratory relief alone or declaratory and remedial
relief combined.185
150 (1923) ; Blakeslee v. Wilson, 190 Calif. 479, 213 Pac. 495 (1923) (see 8
Iowa L. Bull. 272); Patterson's Ex v. Patterson, 131 S. E. 217 (Va.-1925)
(see 12 Va. L. R. 591) ; Miller v. Miller, 149 Tenn. 463, 261 S. W. 965 (1923)
(see 24 Col. L. R. 790, 73 U. of Pa. L. R. 100, 34 Yale L. J. 109); Kariher's
Petition, No. 1, 131 Atl. 265 (Pa.-1925) (see 35 Yale L. J. 473; 74 U. of Pa.
L. R. 624) ; McCrory Stores Corp. v. Braunstein, 134 Atl. 752 (N. J.-1926) the
last three dealing with the Uniform Act. For criticisms of the Anway case,
see the dissenting opinion therein; Borchard, op. cit., note 131 supra; 19 Mich.
L. R. 86; 21 Col. L. R. 168; 4 I11. L. Q. 126; 6 A. B. A. Jour. 145; 7 ibid.,
141; 7 Corn. L. Q. 255; 28 W. Va. L. Q. 1; 5 Minn. L. R. 172. But cf. dicta
in Liberty Warehouse v. Grannis, 47 Sup. Ct. 282 (1927), criticised by Pro-
fessors Sunderland, 25 Mich. L. R. 529, and Borchard, 36 Yale L. J. 845 (April,
1927).
'Under the Connecticut Act, supra, the court has "power in any action
or proceeding to declare rights and other legal relations on request for such
declaration whether or not further relief is or could be claimed, and such
declaration shall have the force of a final judgment." The judges were directed
to make rules to carry the Act into effect, and pursuant to this direction,
made admirable rules (Conn. Prac. Bk. 1922, p. 255, 6) which are quoted in
full in Braman v. Babcock, n. 133 supra. These state the scope of the remedy
in broad terms, the conditions requisite thereto (interest of the parties; actual
question in dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal relations, etc.) the
procedure, permitting the claim for such judgment without claim for conse-
quential relief, or with claim for coercive relief either as an alternative or
an independent remedy, or by a defendant on cross-complaint; the costs, and
the effect of the decision as a final judgment. The remedy is now being
freely employed in Connecticut. See n. 138 infra. The New York statute is
embodied in C. P. A., sec. 473, although the rules, C. P. A. r. 210-214 are not
so definite and clear. The Uniform Act is so drawn that no further rules to
carry it out are contemplated. Sections 2 to 5 of that act amplify the general
statement in section 1 of the classes of cases where the remedy may be
employed. Borchard, 36 Harv. L. R. 697; Gordon, 9 Va. L. R. 169; Freeman,
Judgments, 5th ed., 2784-2786.
" See e.g., Joy v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 98 Conn. 794, 120 Atl.
684 (1923); 33 Yale L. J. 105; cf. Tanner v. Boynton Lumber Co., 129 Atl.
617 (N. J.-1925) ; Ezzell v. Ezzell, 207 Ky. 615, 269 S. W. 752 (1925). See
sec. 8 of the Uniform Act, construed in Sloan v. Longcope, 135 Atl. 117 (Pa.-
1927).
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The Michigan decision seems to have had the effect of making
courts somewhat cautious to grant this simple and desirable relief
in many cases where it is proper. Some statutes even have provided
that the power is conferred to grant such judgments "in cases of
actual controversy only." On the surface this might seem a not
undesirable provision since the courts cannot be expected to act in
purely academic cases; but it is unnecessary as no one would expect.
them to act in such cases anyhow, and the presence of the clause
seems to have had a restrictive effect upon the decisions. The courts
are likely to put too narrow a construction upon these words and to
demand a fully ripe litigation as a condition to giving the relief
where there should be required merely, as the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has said, "an actual controversy or the ripening seeds of
one."13 6 It has also been suggested that the relief should not be
given where another form of remedy is available, and in one case
the relief was denied on the theory that the remedy of quo warranto
might be employed.1 37 This again seems unfortunate since it tends
to make this a separate form of action rather than simply an
auxiliary relief to allow the court to do complete justice and to
endeavor to end litigation at one time. The declaratory judgment
should not be considered an extraordinary remedy; it should be
considered a simple ordinary auxiliary remedy to be asked for and
given whenever it will remove uncertainty in the rights of a litigant
or settle a controversy immediate or incipient.1 38
=" Kariher's Petition, No. 1, note 133 supra. See Shearer v. Backer, 207
Ky. 455, 269 S. W. 543 (1925); Axton v. Goodman, 205 Ky. 382, 265 S. W.
806 (1924) criticised by Professor Borchard in 35 Yale L. J. 475, 6. See also
West v. Wichita, 118 Kan. 265, 234, p. 978 (1925); State v. Bd. of Comrs.,
Kan. 230 Pac. 531 (1924); Kelly v. Jackson, 206 Ky. 815, 268 S. W. 539
(1925) ; Procter v. Avondale Heights Co., 200 Ky. 477, 255 S. W. 81 (1923) ;
Naugle v. Baumann, 125 Atl. 489 (N. J.-1924) ; Colo. & Utah Coal Co. v.
Walter, 75 Colo. 489, 226 Pac. 864 (1924) ; Hodges v. Hamblen Co., 277 S. W.
901 (Tenn.-1925); cf. Loesch v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 218 N. Y. S. 412
(1926), criticised by Professor Borchard in 36 Yale L. J. 403; also in 27 Colum-
bia L. R. 332.
'Kaleikau v. Hall, 27 Haw. 420 (1923) ; see also In re List's Estate, 283
Pa. 255, 129 At. 64 (1925) and the criticism in 35 Yale L. J. 474, 5. The
English courts raised a question as to whether a negative declaration (plain-
tiff's no-right; defendant's privilege) was permissible. Many Ameriian stat-
utes, including the Uniform Act, so provide specifically, and it should be so
held in any event. See Connecticut Act and Rules, and the Uniform Act and
citations thereon in note 134 supra; also 28 Yale L. J. 1, 9.
' Cf. Yale University v. New Haven, 104 Conn. 610, 134 Atl. 268 (1926)
(see 36 Yale L. J. 147) ; Hewitt v. Sanborn, 103 Conn. 352, 364, 378, 134 Atl.
268 (1925) ; Russo v. Corideo, 102 Conn. 663, 129 Atl. 849 (1925) ; Lehmaier
v. Bradford, 99 Conn. 468, 121 At. 810 (1923); Bd. of Education v. Van
Zandt, 195 N. Y. S. 297; Craig v. Cornrs. of Sinking Fund, 203 N. Y. S. 236;
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The declaratory judgment may be asked for upon either an equit-
able claim or a legal claim.13 9  A question may be raised whether it
should be considered an equitable proceeding, justifying refusal of
trial by jury. The basis for such an assertion seems to be that it
developed from the chancery courts in England.140 To hold that
such claims were to be tried only by the court might seem desirable
on the surface as limiting the more inefficient trial by jury, but in
the long run it would probably prove quite undesirable since it would
tend to restrict judges in granting the declaratory judgment if they
felt thereby that a litigant's usual right to trial by jury would be
limited. Here, too, the rule already discussed should govern,
namely, that the issues finally claimed for trial should control the
question of form of trial rather than a, particular theory or claim
of relief. 141
The new form of relief is being taken for granted in many states
now and declarations of rights have been given in various classes or
cases.1 42 This procedural remedy will undoubtedly be more used
in the future.
Sainer v. Kantor, 123 Misc. 469, 205 N. Y. S. 760; Kings Co. Trust Co. v.
Melville, 216 N. Y. S. 278 (1926); Reynolds v, Browning, King & Co., 217
N. Y. S. 15 (1926); Re Dommell's Est., 134 Atl. 379 (Pa.-1926). "Many
courts, notably those of Connecticut and New York, now take the new form of
action for granted, and do not especially refer to it in their opinions. For
that reason, the digesters often fail to refer to the fact that the action was
declaratory in form, and the bar thus frequently overlooks procedural pre-
cedents thereby created." 35 Yale L. J. 478, n. 20. Cf. also Empire Natural
Gas Co. v. Thorp, 245 Pac. 1058 (Kan.-1926) noted in 25 Mich. L. R. 821; also
comment in 12 Ia. L. Bull. 62
'1 Where law and equity are not combined, the declaration must be sought
in the proper tribunal. Paterson v. Currier, 129 At. 711 (N. J.-1925) (decla-
ration as to realty title should have been sought in the law, not the equity
court; so also in Wight v. Bd. of Education, 133 Atl. 387 (N. J.-1926). The
first draft of the Uniform Act restricted the power to courts having juris-
diction in equity. Borchard, 36 Harv. L. R. 702, 703, but this limitation was
wisely omitted from the final draft (see Gordon and Freeman, note 134 supra),
and is not found in the usual statute, note 131 supra.
' Borchard, 28 Yale L. J. 25-28. The power is still most freely exer-
cised in the Chancery Division, ibid., although Farwell, L. J., in Chapman v.
Michaelson (1909) 1 Ch. 238, 243, denied that it was strictly "equitable relief."
Most American statutes provide that the court "may" send issues to the jury.
See Uniform Act, sec. 9; N. Y. C. P. A. rule 213; Conn. Prac. Bk., p. 65, sec.
648 ("as in other actions"). "May" should be construed as "must" where the
issue, if arising in an action for consequential relief, would be triable to the
jury. Borchard, 36 Harv. L. R. 714, 5.
'- See Trial of Actions Under the Code, 11 Corn. L. Q. 482 (1926).
'In addition to the cases cited above, see 35 Yale L. J. 473-477 for a dis-
cussion of many recent cases applying the declaratory judgment. For state-
ments of the rule that in the absence of legislation, courts will not decide "most
questions," or act in advance of actual injury to the plaintiff, see Micklish v.
THE COMPLAINT-ALLEGATIONS
BILLS OF PARTICULARS
A bill of particulars is a document setting forth the particulars of
a pleader's claim which is supposedly not definitely enough stated in
his original complaint. At common law it could be required of a
pleader in any form of action and was not limited to contract actions
merely. Where the adverse party sought a bill of particulars, he
was required to file with his motion an affidavit showing in what
respect he needed to know further particulars of the plaintiff's
claim.14
3
Under the codes, in general, a bill of particulars may still be had
and by the more usual rule may be had in all the cases available at
common law, including matters of defense or set-off.1 4 4 There is
some authority, however, that it may only be had in actions involving
an account, or for money demands arising upon contract.145 This
is in part due to the fact that the code provision for a bill of
particulars refers to an action based upon an account.' 48
The office of the bill of particulars may be covered in large
measure by a motion on the part of the defendant to require that
the complaint be made more definite and certain and by an amend-
Grand Lodge, 162 Ark. 71, 257 S. W. 353 (1924) ; Burton v. Durham Realty
Co., 188 N. C. 473, 125 S. E. 3 (1924) ; Yates v. Beasley, 133 Miss. 301, 97 So.
676 (1923); Richardson v. Mayes, 223 S. W. 546 (Tex.-1920) ; Univ. of Utah
v. Indust. Com'n., 64 Utah 221, 229 Pac. 1103 (1924) ; State v. Circuit Court,
178 Wis. 89, 190 N. W. 563 (1922) ; Panama Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 289 F. 964(1923).
" Johnson v. Birely, 5 B. & A. 540 (1822) ; Tilton v. Beecher, 59 N. Y. 176
(1874) citing cases; Dixon v. Swenson, 127 Atl. 591 (N. J.-1925) ; 31 Cyc.
565; 19 Ii. L. R. 315.
4 Tilton v. Beecher, supra; Markel Tucker Lock Co., Inc. v. Ehrlich, 204
N. Y. S. 876 (1924) ; Stern v. Woodhouse, 205 N. Y. S. 352; annotations to
N. Y. C. P.' A., sec. 247. Allowed in actions of slander and libel, Irwin v
Taubman, 30 S. D. 502, 139 N. W. 115 (1912) annotated in Ann. Cas. 1915 C,
1266-1269; in negligence actions, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 105-111, stating that the
motion to make more definite and certain is the more usual practice; 3 Ann.
Cas. 161-163; 35 Am. St. Rep. 883; Dec. Dig. P1., sec. 317, 319; see Bills of
Particulars in Actions Based upon Negligence, 49 Cent. L. J. 362 (1899);
L. D. Landrum, 50 Cent. L. J. 364 (1900).
.. Bd. of Co. Com'rs. v. Am. Loan & Trust Co., 75 Minn. 489, 78 N. W.
113 (1899). Under the special statutory procedure in Connecticut the bill of
particulars is used only in connection with the common counts. Conn. G. S.
1918, sec. 5651; Prac. Bk. 1922, p. 279, 358; Price v. Boutieller, 79 Conn. 255,
64 Atl. 227 (1906) ; note 44 supra.
' It is usually provided that the plaintiff need not set forth in a pleading
the items of an account therein alleged, but must, after demand, give the
adverse party a copy of the account. See the statutes cited, note 52 supra.
Some of the codes go further: "The court . . . may order a further ac-
count, when the one delivered is defective, and the court may, in all cases,
order a bill of particulars of the claim of either party to be furnished."
Wash. Rem. Comp. St. 1922, sec. 284; N. Y. C. P. A., sec. 247; S. D. Rev.
Code 1919, sec. 2362; S. C. Code 1922, sec. 419; N. D. Comp. L. 1913, sec.
7457; N. C. Consol. St. 1919, sec. 534; Wis. Stat. 1921, sec. 2672.
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ment on the part of the plaintiff of his complaint. 147 It would seem
immaterial what form the provision takes, whether the addition
should be made by a bill of particulars or by amendment. Under
the theory of some states, however, a bill of particulars is given a
somewhat more limited application than an amendment or a sub-
stituted complaint. It has been ruled that a bill of particulars when
filed limits the complaint so that nothing can be claimed beyond
what is set forth in the bill.148  On the other hand, it has been held
that a bill of particulars adds nothing to the complaint so that the
plaintiff cannot rely upon his bill of particulars to supplement his
complaint. 149  It would seem simpler and more desirable to hold
that the plaintiff need not resort to an amendment in such case but
that his claim now is to be considered upon a basis of both his
complaint and his bill of particulars and whatever is fairly and
reasonably claimed upon a construction of both should be considered
to be sufficiently pleaded. 150
An order for a bill of particulars or for a more definite statement
in the plaintiff's complaint is a highly desirable remedy in view of
the lack of a definite standard of particularity of allegation required
under the codes. Such order should not, however, be entered as of
course whenever the defendant claims that he is in doubt, but only
upon a showing to the court that fair notice demands the additional
matter upon which particulars are asked.' 5 '
.4. See note 150 infra.
4 Colby v. Wilson, 151 N. E. 269 (111.-1926) ; Anderson v. Rucker Bros.,
107 Wash. 595, 183 Pac. 70 (1919) annotated in 8 A. L. R. 550-563; DuPont
Automobile Distributors v. DuPont Motors, 213 A. D. 313, 210 N. Y. S. 577
(1925).
" Graves v. McLaurin, 66 Fla. 230, 63 So. 439 (1907) ; Singers-Bigger v.
Young, 166 F. 82 (1908); Applebaum v. Goldman, 155 Mich. 369, 121 N. W.
288 (1909) ; Marshall v. Sackett & Wilhelns Co., 166 A. D. 141, 151 N. Y. S.
1045 (1915); Dudley v. Duval, 29 Wash. 528, 70 Pac. 68 (1902) where the
defendant claimed that the bill supplemented the complaint. But see Gage v.
Billing, 12 Cal. App. 668, 108 Pac. 664 (1910) ; Underwood v. Scott, 43 Nan.
714, 23 Pac. 942 (1890). It is not the office of the bill of particulars to sub-
stitute a new cause of action or defense. St. Albans Beef Co. v. Aldridge,
112 A. D. 803, 99 N. Y. S. 398 (1906); cf. Harmon v. Alfred Peats Co., 243
N. Y. 473, 154 N. E. 314 (1926).
'Cf. Conover v. Knight, 8W Wis. 639, 54 N. W. 1002 (1893): "We are
not disposed to draw any nice distinction between the functions of an order
for a bill of particulars and an order requiring a pleading to be made more
definite and certain, for we think such a distinction has no tangible existence
in reason or law." Approved, Stocklen v. Barrett, 58 Ore. 281, 115 Pac. 108
(1911); and in note 24 Mich. L. R. 315 on Ashton Bill Co. v. Bailey, 6 F.
(2d.) 235 (1925). See also Universal Oil Products Co. v. Spelly Oil Co., 12
F. (2d.) 271 (1926).
" 
1 ohnson v. Birely, note 143 supra; 32 Yale L. J. 488, 489; Oppcnheim v.
Sterling Tire Corp., 126 Atl. 728 (Del.-1924); Cohn v. Baldwin, 74 Hun
(N. Y.) 346, 26 N. Y. S. 457 (1893) ; 31 Cyc. 585.
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THE CONSTRUCTION OF PLEADINGS
The common law rule was quite definite that all pleadings were
to be more strongly construed against the pleader on the ground
that he would state his case in its strongest aspects. Accordingly,
in case of any doubt any statement in the pleading was to be taken
in its most unfavorable aspect toward the person making it.1 -2 The
code represented in part a reaction from this somewhat harsh view,
and hence the code provisions of almost all the states definitely
provide that the pleadings shall be liberally construed, with a view to
carry out their obvious intent.153 In spite of such statements in
the code itself, the statements in the cases are still conflicting. Many
code cases still say that the pleadings are to be more strongly con-
strued against the pleader as at common law.154 Others say that
the pleadings are to be liberally construed in favor of the pleader. 155
The cases would indicate that little help is to be gained from such
presumption. It is at the most but a suggestion to the court which
is trying to find some meaning from written words. Even if the
court has determined to be somewhat liberal in its attitude, it is
doubtful if it will care to read into the pleading something it cannot
find therein, although it feels that the pleader must have expected to
put it therein. Probably a better test than one based upon a
presumption derived from the authorship of the pleading is the one
previously noted that the pleadings must give fair notice to the
court and to the opposing side of the pleader's position. As pointed
out above, this is not a rule of thumb test but rather the statement
Stephen, Pleading, ed. Williston, 415; Shipman, Common Law Pleading,
ed. Ball., 518, 519; Lyons v. Reinecke, 10 F. (2d.) 3 (1926); Klemtner v.
Peters, 106 So. 401 (Fla.-1925) ; O'Quinn v. Carter, 34 Ga. App. 310, 129 S. E.
296 (1925).
l "In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its
effect, its allegations shall be liberally construed, with a view to substantial
justice between the parties." First Rep. N. Y. Com'rs. P1. & Prac. 1848, sec.
136; N. Y. C. P. A., sec. 275. Repeated in all the codes except Arizona and
Kentucky. See e.g., Calif. C. C. P. 1923, sec. 452 ("must"); Wash. Rem.
Comp. St. 1922, sec. 285; North Carolina, Consol. St., 1919, sec. 535.
' Philbin v. Creasey Corp., 274 S. W. 1113 (Ky.-1925) ; Witham v. Blood,
124 Ia. 695, 100 N. W. 558 (1904) ; Nicholson v. Leatham, 28 Cal. App. 597,
604, 153 Pac. 965, 155 Pac. 98 (1915). The statements in the decisions of a
single state are often conflicting. See Sunderland, quoted note 156 infra;
cases collected Dec. Dig. Pl. sec. 34; 31 Cyc. 78-81.
' Seeley v. Morris, 242 Pac. 359 (Wash.-1926); Guaranty State Bk. v.
Sumner, 278 S. W. 459 (Tex.-1926) ; Conrad v. Bd. of Education, 190 N. C.
389, 130 S. E. 53 (1925); Walker v. Traylor Engg. Co. 12 F. (2nd.) 382
(1926) ; Hornwell v. Ark. etc. Co~p. Assn., 276 S. W. 371 (Ark.-1925) ; Sage
v. Culver, 147 N. Y. 241, 41 N. E. 513 (1895); State v. Ford Motor Co., 151
N. E. 171 (Ohio-1926) ; cf. Pettijohn v. Halloran, 206 N. W. 631 (Ia.-1925).
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of the ideal of pleading, leaving its particular applications to the
exact case before the court.'5 6
Certain subordinate rules of construction have at times been
resorted to by the courts. Thus a pleading must be construed as a
whole and not by detached parts ;57 words may be read in their
ordinary and popular sense where clearly so intended, even against
a judicial or statutory definition;158 abbreviations clearly under-
stood will be read as though the words were written in full;159
clerical mistakes, where the intended meaning is clear, will not vitiate
the pleading;160 and even where a strict rule of construction is
adopted against a pleading on demurrer, a liberal rule will be fol-
lowed where objection is first made at the trial or on appeal. 101
Specific allegations control and limit general allegations' 6 2 and state-
ments of facts control statements of conclusions.' 63
' See 35 Yale L. J. 265. Cf. Sunderland, Cas. Code P1., 750, note: "There
is much conflict in the language of the decisions in the code states on this
subject of construction of pleadings on demurrer, and even the same court
seldom adheres to an entirely consistent policy. In each case as it comes up
the court attempts to do justice to the parties, and there seems to be little
difference in the general results whether the rule announced calls for a liberal
construction or, as is true in many code states, for a construction against the
pleader. It is indeed doubtful whether pleadings are construed very differ-
ently under the code than they are in states which still retain the common law
form of pleading. The construction of pleadings is determined by the gen-
eral liberal or technical attitude of the judiciary more than by statute, and
that attitude is not very closely subject to legislative control."
.. State ex rel. Kansas City etc. Co. v. Dew, 279 S. W. 65 (Mo.-1926);
Carpenter Const. Co. v. Sevonover, 148 N. E. 429 (Ind.-1925); Molineux v.
Hurlbut, 79 Conn. 243, 64 At. 350 (1906); 31 Cyc. 83.
' Cook v. Warren, 88 N. Y. 37 (1882) (declining under the circumstances
to depart from the statutory meaning) ; 31 Cyc. 80, 81.
Odd Fellows Bldg. Assn. v. Hogan., 28 Ark. 261 (1873) ; D. R. Vivion
Mfg. Co. v. Robertson, 176 Mo. 219, 75 S. W. 644 (1903); Dec. Dig. PI.,
sec. 29.
'State v. Quantie, 87 Mont. 32, 94 Pac. 491 (1908) ; Ky. Ont. Ry. Co. v.
Carr, 19 Ky. L. R. 1172, 43 S. W. 193 (1897); King v. Marl & Express Co
113 A. D. 90, 98 N. Y. S. 891 (1906); Dec. Dig. P1., sec. 30. Luckily bad
grammar does not vitiate a pleading, Moore v. Beern, 83 Ind. 219 (1882).
'Dodson v. Bend, 242 Pac. 821 (Ore.-1926); Black Dog Lumber Co. v.
Stepp, 277 S. W. 466 (Ky.-1925); Natl. Surety Co. p. Bk. of Debeque, 240
Pac. 691 (Colo.-1925); Dec. Dig. P1., sec. 34 (6) (7).
'Fortier v. Larabie Bros., 241 Pac. 237 (Mont.-1925) ; Anderson vi. Inter-
River etc. Dist., 274 S. W. 448 (Mo.-1925). See supra on negligence actions,
notes 70, 71; Dec. Dig. P1., sec. 34 (2).
'Little v. Union Oil Co., 238 Pac. 1066 (Cal.-1925) ; Owens v. Anchor
Duck Mills, 34 Ga. App. 347, 129 S. E. 301 (1925). As to the construction of
the prayer for relief see 35 Yale L. J. 289, 290. As to other rules of con-
struction see Bryant, Code Fl., 2d ed.. 298-300.
